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Abstract
Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative
prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either be-
cause these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital
goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper
provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment dis-
tortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level
of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a
model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incom-
plete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in
the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn,
this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative
prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up
being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.
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1 Introduction
This paper is about understanding why per–capita income co–varies positively with
the PPP–adjusted investment rate and negatively with the relative price of capital
goods. Our primary conclusion is that cross–country differences in the quality of legal
institutions may be an important factor contributing to such patterns.
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Figure 1: Investment Rates and Income Levels.
Heston and Summers (1988, 1996) first emphasized that the behavior of invest-
ment rates in the cross–section of countries is sensitive to the prices used to compute
them. When capital goods are valued using international prices, investment rates
covary positively with income. But when domestic prices are used, the positive as-
sociation disappears; see Figure 1, which was constructed using data from Heston,
Summers, and Aten’s (2002) Penn World Table, version 6.1. For the two patterns
to be compatible, the relative price of investment goods with respect to consump-
tion goods must be negatively correlated with income. This third fact is reported by
De Long and Summers (1991), Easterly (1993), and Jones (1994), and documented
in Figure 2.1 These observations suggest that rich and poor countries devote similar
fractions of their incomes to investment expenditures, but the former obtain a higher
yield in terms of capital goods.
The economic development literature has produced two closely related rational-
izations for the just–described evidence. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argue that poor
countries may have lower investment rates simply because they are relatively more
efficient in the production of consumption goods. This would make investment goods
1The series of relative prices was constructed using the price indexes for consumption and invest-
ment goods reported in the Penn World Table 6.1. The methodology followed in constructing these
indexes is outlined in Heston and Summers (1991) and in the technical documentation available at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
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Figure 2: Relative price of Investment Goods and Income Levels.
relatively more expensive, thereby lowering PPP–adjusted investment rates. Accord-
ing to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001), varia-
tion in a generic form of investment distortion (wedge) is responsible for the evidence.
Both of these mechanisms, when calibrated to match the heterogeneity in prices in
the neoclassical growth model, can generate sizeable variation in investment rates.
The next challenge is to understand the origin of either form of cross–country hetero-
geneity (in relative TFP or in wedges). This is crucial if our goal is to identify ways
to spur development in poor countries. In this paper, we provide a micro–foundation
for the variation in distortions and evaluate its economic significance.
In our model, countries have access to the same technologies. They differ, how-
ever, in the extent to which the commercial law and its enforcement protect outside
investors, such as bondholders and minority shareholders, from expropriation by com-
pany insiders. Several recent papers, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998), provide evidence in support of this hypothesis. Our other key assump-
tion is that firms producing investment goods face higher baseline idiosyncratic risk
than firms producing consumption goods. Data drawn from COMPUSTAT Files pro-
vides strong support for this hypothesis. Even after controlling for a set of observable
characteristics and for unobserved heterogeneity, companies producing capital goods
display a much higher volatility of sales growth. To our knowledge, this is a novel
result.
Ours is a fairly standard two–sector overlapping generation model of capital ac-
cumulation. The two industries produce investment goods and consumption goods,
respectively. Each individual is born endowed with entrepreneurial talent and de-
cides whether to allocate it to the production of investment or consumption goods.
Either way, he will have access to a technology displaying decreasing returns to cap-
2
ital. Output is assumed stochastic, i.i.d. across technologies, and known only to the
technology’s owner. The only difference across sectors is that cash flows are more
volatile for firms producing investment goods. Young individuals, who we refer to
as entrepreneurs, borrow capital from the old through financial intermediaries. The
interaction between entrepreneurs and intermediaries takes the familiar form of an
optimal contracting problem under asymmetric information. The optimal contract
trades off risk–sharing and incentive provision. We model institutions by assuming
that entrepreneurs who misreport their outcomes and hide resources face a deadweight
loss. The magnitude of this loss reflects the effectiveness of all institutional features
that protect outside investors from expropriation by company insiders. The larger
the loss, the better the investor protection (the quality of institutions).
The optimal contract dictates that in either sector risk–sharing is increasing in
the level of investor protection and decreasing in the volatility of cash flows. Given
that risk is higher for firms producing investment goods, this implies a wedge between
the returns to investment in the capital and in the consumption good sector, which
is only partially compensated by an increase in the price of capital. In turn, this
induces a reallocation of resources away from the production of capital goods and
towards consumption goods. Since the size of the wedge is larger the poorer the
investor protection, better legal institutions yield a lower relative price of capital,
higher investment rate, and higher national income.
The quantitative assessment of the model requires taking stands on firm–level
volatility in the two sectors, on the quality of legal institutions across countries, and
on the degree of international capital mobility. Idiosyncratic risks are calibrated using
our own estimates. Whenever possible, a country’s investor protection is set in such
a way that the model–implied relative price equals its counterpart in the Penn World
Table. Finally, barriers to international capital flows are set so that the resulting
cross–country dispersion in interest rates is consistent with the data.
Our model accounts for at least 38% and as much as 81% of the variance of log–
investment rates implied by the 1996 Penn World Table. Or, alternatively, for at least
74% and as much as 100% of the Gini coefficient of the distribution of investment
rates.
Our paper is closely related to recent contributions by Caselli and Gennaioli
(2003), Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004),
Restuccia (2004), Erosa and Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo
(2007), and Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008). In common with these authors, we in-
vestigate the implications of allocative inefficiencies for economic development. Our
3
paper is closest to Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) and Erosa and Hi-
dalgo Cabrillana’s (2008). As is the case here, in these papers the allocative inef-
ficiency is the result of information asymmetries in financial markets, and its mag-
nitude depends on the quality of institutions designed to protect investors. Finally,
our paper is also part of a recent literature that models investor protection in general
equilibrium.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide ev-
idence in support of our assumption on the cross–sectoral variation in idiosyncratic
risk. We introduce the model in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we define and charac-
terize the competitive equilibrium allocation assuming a closed economy. In Section
6 we augment the model to allow for international trade. In Section 7 we describe our
calibration procedure. Section 8 is dedicated to comparative statics exercises. The
quantitative assessment is conducted in Section 9. In Section 10 we conduct tests of
two further restrictions that our theory imposes on the data. Finally, in Section 11
we conclude by discussing a few extensions of our setup.
2 Evidence on Firm–Level Volatility
In this section we provide evidence supporting our premise that firms manufacturing
investment goods face higher baseline idiosyncratic risk than firms producing con-
sumption goods. For reasons that will become clearer in Section 3, we are interested
in assessing the fraction of risk that is not accounted for by factors that would be
known to a firm’s financier. Some of these factors are observable by the econometri-
cian, e.g., size and age. Others, such as firm–specific characteristics and sector–specific
shocks, are not. Our objective is to test whether the conditional standard deviation
of sales growth is systematically higher for firms producing investment goods.
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of 7,070 firms, distributed in 57 3–digit NAICS
sectors. It consists of a total of 73,112 firm–year observations, drawn from Standard &
Poor’s COMPUSTAT North–America Industrial Annual Database from 1950 to 2005.
Our sample selection procedure is detailed in Appendix A. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ Benchmark Input–Output tables provide information on the contribution
of each industry to final demand uses. We classify an industry as in the consumption
good sector if the destination of at least 60% of its output is final consumption. We
use an analogous rule to assign industries to the investment good category, and we
2Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) study the effect of investor protection on the size of the equity
market and the number of public firms. Fabbri (2007) extends their analysis to consider the impact
of the quality of legal institutions on firm size and aggregate activity. Albuquerque and Wang (2008)
look at the asset pricing implications.
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discard sectors with very similar, or virtually no contribution to either final use.
Our measure of sales is Compustat item # 12, net sales. We first compute the
portion of sales growth that is not accounted for by factors, either known or unknown
to the econometrician, that are systematically associated with firm growth. We do
this by estimating the following equation:
∆ log(sales)ijt = αi + δjt + β1j log(size)ijt + β2j log(age)ijt + εijt. (1)
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real sales for firm i in sector j, between
years t and t + 1. Real sales are net sales over the BEA’s 2–digit sector–specific
price deflator for value added. The dummy variable αi is a firm–specific fixed effect
that accounts for unobserved firm heterogeneity, i.e. for the eventuality that firms
have permanently different growth rates for reasons that are unknown to us. We also
include a full set of sector–specific year dummies, denoted by δjt. These dummies
offer a flexible way to control for changes in sales induced by a variety of industry–
wide factors. Among them are events, like weather shocks, changes in the economy’s
product mix, and business cycle fluctuations, which tend to have a systematically
different impact on different sectors. In particular, investment expenditures are well–
known to be much more volatile than consumption expenditures at the business cycle
frequency (see for example Kydland and Prescott (1990)). Finally, size and age are
included because the empirical Industrial Organization literature has shown that firm
growth declines with both of these variables (see Evans (1987) and Hall (1987)). Size
is Compustat item # 29, employees, whereas age is the time since a firm first appeared
in the sample.3,4
The objects of our interest are the estimated residuals εˆijt. We proceed by esti-
mating the following equation:5
log εˆ2ijt = θj + uijt. (2)
Letting θˆj denote the point estimate of the dummy coefficient θj ,
√
exp(θˆj) is our
estimate of the conditional standard deviation of annual sales growth for firms in
3The number of employees is the most common measure of firm size in the empirical IO literature.
Its main advantage is that it is relatively immune to measurement problems.
4In our theory, firm–level stochastic disturbances are modeled as TFP shocks. In light of this
choice, it would be interesting to repeat the exercise of this section using firm–level TFP growth as
the dependent variable in regression (1). In principle, this can be accomplished by obtaining a panel
of firm–level Solow residuals from our dataset. Unfortunately, Compustat data presents a series of
shortcomings that make it ill–suited for this type of analysis. In particular, it severely mismeasures
physical capital.
5This formulation results from the assumption of a particular functional form for the sectoral
variance, σ2j = σ
2 exp(θj). It is a special case of the multiplicative heteroscedasticity model analyzed
by Harvey (1976).
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Figure 3: Volatility of sales growth per 3–digit industry.
sector j. The estimates for all sectors are reported in Table 7 and graphed in Figure
3, sorted in ascending order. The 3–digit figures are the NAICS codes of the largest
sectors by value added. Almost all investment good sectors rank among the most
volatile in the economy. Among them are Machinery Manufacturing (code 333) and
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing (334), as well as Construction (233
and 234). Firms in Food Manufacturing (311) and Apparel Manufacturing (315),
two of the largest consumption good sectors in most economies, are significantly less
volatile.6 ,7
We conducted a series of robustness checks; details are reported in Appendix A.
Our results do not change in any appreciable way when we vary the sample selection
procedure or the regression equation specification.
Campbell, Lettau, and Malkiel (2001) study the impact of idiosyncratic firm–level
shocks on individual stock returns. Since the object and methods of their analysis are
different from ours, a direct comparison between our results and theirs is infeasible.
Still, we find comfort in the fact that their volatility ranking is broadly consistent with
ours. As it is the case here, Campbell, Lettau, and Malkiel (2001) find that firms
6We have also tested the null hypothesis that the conditional volatility is the same for firms be-
longing to consumption and investment good sectors. The Breusch–Pagan test rejects it categorically
at the conventional significance level (The Breusch–Pagan test statistic is equal to 804.045, with a
p–value lower than 0.0001).
7Interestingly, an inspection of the estimates reported in Table 6 reveals that firms producing
durable goods tend to be more volatile than those producing non–durables.
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producing consumer goods are among the least volatile, while firms manufacturing
computers are among the most volatile.
We close this section by briefly addressing three natural questions about this
analysis.
Our model assumes that the cross–sectoral heterogeneity in volatility is the same
across countries. Would information gathered in other countries deliver estimates
similar to those obtained for the US? Lack of detailed micro data for most countries
prevents us from answering this question. Notice, however, that our theoretical anal-
ysis does not rely on volatilities being the same. Rather, it only needs the rankings
of sectors by volatility to be the same.8
Firms in Compustat tend to be larger and older than their peers not included in
the sample, and therefore are likely to be less volatile. Is selection likely to bias our
estimates? We partially addressed this issue by controlling for age and size. However,
there may be other, unknown factors, that cause firms’ sales growth volatility to be
systematically higher or lower than the average US firm’s. What is comforting is
that as long as these factors have the same impact across sectors, the ranking of
volatilities will not be influenced by the selection procedure. Absent data on the
whole size distribution, we cannot establish conclusively whether this is the case.9
What are the causes of the cross–sectoral variation in conditional sales growth
volatility? Since addressing this question is beyond the scope of this paper, in our
theory we take a reduced–form approach, assuming that firms are hit by TFP shocks
with sector–specific variances. Our conjecture, however, is that in most sectors pro-
ducing investment and durable consumption goods there is a greater scope for process
and product innovation. Klenow (1996)’s findings on the distribution of R&D expen-
ditures across 2– and 3–digit industries seem to be consistent with this hypothesis.10
We think of firms in these sectors as being arranged on a quality ladder, e.g., Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). The adoption of an innovation
ahead of its peers allows a laggard to advance to the frontier and boost its sales,
8To our knowledge, the only attempt at estimating cross–sectoral variation in idiosyncratic risk
across countries was carried out by Michelacci and Schivardi (2008). According to their preliminary
results, volatilities are somewhat different across countries. However, in most cases, the rankings
appear to be the same as in the US.
9A separate concern is that cross–sector relative volatilities may have changed over time. Con-
sistent with Comin and Philippon (2005), we find evidence of a positive time trend in volatility for
most industries (a phenomenon that, according to Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2006),
did not extend to the whole size distribution). However, the ranking of sectors has essentially stayed
the same throughout the sample period. Most importantly for the quantitative exercise of Section 9,
the difference between the volatility measures that will be used to calibrate the model has also been
roughly constant over time.
10See Tables 2 and 3 of that paper.
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possibly in a dramatic way. Conversely, the early adoption by a competitor has the
potential to severely depress its results.
3 Model
We consider a simple extension of the standard two–period, two–sector overlapping
generations model. The population is constant and the measure of each cohort is
normalized to one. Individuals are risk–averse. Preferences are time–separable and
the period utility, denoted by u(ct), displays constant relative risk aversion.
11 Let σ
denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Agents discount second–period utility
at the rate β; β > 0.
Young individuals are born without any endowment. In order to consume, they
engage in the production of either consumption goods or investment goods. Both
activities require capital, which is borrowed from the old via financial intermediaries.
Old individuals are idle and consume thanks to assets accumulated when young. The
technology in sector j, j = I, C, is described by the production function yjt = zjtk
α
jt,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and zjt is a random variable i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and over time.
In either sector, capital depreciates at the constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The two sectors
only differ with respect to the distribution of zjt. We posit that, for all entrepreneurs
in sector j, j = I, C, and for all t ≥ 0,
log(zjt) = ζj, ζj ∼ N (µj , η2j ).
In order to capture the difference in the volatility of growth rates across sectors
documented in Section 2, we assume that ηI > ηC . We use pt to denote the relative
price of the investment good in terms of consumption good and Nt to denote the
fraction of entrepreneurs (i.e. the fraction of young agents) engaged in the production
of capital goods. Choosing the consumption good as the numeraire means that there is
no loss of generality in setting the absolute prices to pCt ≡ 1 and pIt ≡ pt, respectively.
In spite of this, using absolute prices will sometimes ease the exposition.
The output realization is private information for the entrepreneurs, opening up
the option of hiding some of their cash flows from their financiers. Hiding, however, is
costly. For every unit of output hidden, an entrepreneur ends up with only ξ ∈ [0, 1].12
The balance is lost in the hiding process. The parameter ξ is our measure of the
economy–wide level of investor protection. The larger is ξ, the lower is the protection;
11We restrict our attention to the CRRA family, because utility functions in this class display
non–increasing absolute risk aversion and imply log–additive indirect utility functions.
12Our hiding cost resembles the falsification cost considered by Lacker and Weinberg (1989).
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Figure 4: Timing.
the two extreme values correspond to complete absence of protection (ξ = 1) and
perfect protection (ξ = 0). Finally, we assume that the intermediation industry is
competitive with free entry.
A financing contract offered to a sector–j entrepreneur consists of a capital ad-
vance, kjt, and of a schedule of contingent transfers, τjt(zt). Figure 4 displays the
sequence of events during the life of an agent. An individual starts by investing cap-
ital kjt to produce output equal to ztk
α
jt. Next, he makes a claim about the outcome
of his project z˜t, gives the intermediary output consistent with this claim (z˜tk
α
jt), and
receives a contingent transfer of consumption good τjt(z˜t). At the end of the first
period, entrepreneurs end up with income we denote by mt. Having no endowment,
an agent is unable to report z˜t > zt. Truthful reporting yields mt = τjt(z). Reporting
z˜t < zt yields mt = τjt(z˜t) + ξpjt(zt − z˜t)kαjt. By misrepresenting himself as an agent
that received an outcome z˜t, an entrepreneur hit by zt will receive a transfer τjt(z˜t)
and enjoy the fraction ξ of the hidden output (zt − z˜t)pjtkαjt.
At the end of the first stage of their lives, all agents, regardless of their occupations,
consume part of their incomes and save the rest. At the beginning of the second stage,
they lend their savings to intermediaries at the market rate. Intermediaries channel
those funds to the new cohort of young people. Finally, agents receive and consume
principal plus interest. Notice that rt denotes the return in consumption goods to the
investment of one unit of consumption good.
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4 Competitive Equilibrium
We begin by considering an entrepreneur’s consumption–saving decision. This prob-
lem is the same for all agents. Let v(mt, rt+1) denote the indirect utility of an agent
born at time t, conditional on having received an income mt and on facing an interest
rate rt+1. Then,
v(mt, rt+1) ≡ u [mt − s(mt, rt+1)] + βu [(1 + rt+1)s(mt, rt+1)] ,
where the optimal saving function s(mt, rt+1) is
s (mt, rt+1) ≡ argmax
s
{u (mt − s) + βu [(1 + rt+1) s]} .
Under our assumptions on preferences, it follows that
s(mt, rt+1) = κ (rt+1)mt (3)
and
v(mt, rt+1) = u(mt)[u(1 − κ(rt+1)) + βu(κ(rt+1)(1 + rt+1))], (4)
where κ (rt+1) ≡ [1 + β− 1σ (1 + rt+1)
σ−1
σ ]−1.
Financing contracts in sector j consist of a non–negative capital advance kjt and
a function τjt : <+ → <+ that solve13
max
kjt,τjt(z)
∫
v[τjt(z), rt+1]fj(z)dz, (P)
subject to incentive compatibility, i.e.
v[τjt(z), rt+1] ≥ v[τjt(z′) + ξpjt(z − z′)kαjt, rt+1] ∀ z, z′, z ≥ z′, (5)
and the zero–profit condition for intermediaries:
τ¯jt ≡
∫
τjt(z)fj(z)dz = pjtz¯jk
α
jt − (rt + δ) pItkjt, (6)
with z¯j =
∫
zfj(z)dz.
We now define a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 Given an initial aggregate capital stock K0 > 0, a competitive equilib-
rium is a non–negative consumption level of the initial old, co0, and sequences of young
and old agents’ non–negative consumption allocations {cyjt(z)}∞t=0 and {cojt(z)}∞t=1,
contracts {kjt, τjt(z)}∞t=0, aggregate capital {Kt}∞t=1, measures of entrepreneurs in the
investment good sector {Nt}∞t=0, relative prices {pt}∞t=0, and interest rates {rt}∞t=0,
such that
13Unless otherwise specified, all integrals are computed on [0,+∞), the natural support of the
lognormal distribution.
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1. co0 = p0K0(1 + r0),
and, at all t ≥ 0:
2. cyjt(z) = τjt(z) − s(τjt(z), rt+1) and coj,t+1(z) = s(τjt(z), rt+1)(1 + rt+1), ∀z and
for j = I, C;
3. {kIt, τIt(z)} solves problem (P) for pIt = pt;
4. {kCt, τCt(z)} solves problem (P) for pCt = 1;
5. Nt ∈ [0, 1];
6. young individuals are indifferent between the two sectors:
∫
v(τIt(z), rt+1)fI(z)dz =
∫
v(τCt(z), rt+1)fC(z)dz; (7)
7. aggregate savings are equal to the value of the capital stock:
ptKt+1 = Nt
∫
s (τIt(z), rt+1) fI(z)dz+(1−Nt)
∫
s (τCt(z), rt+1) fC(z)dz; (8)
8. gross investment equals the production of investment goods:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Ntz¯IkαIt; (9)
and
9. the market for capital clears:
Kt = NtkIt + (1−Nt)kCt. (10)
5 Analysis
5.1 Perfect Investor Protection
When investor protection is perfect, our model reduces to the standard two–period,
two–sector model of capital accumulation. The necessary conditions for optimality in
production are
αpjtz¯jk
α−1
jt = pIt(rt + δ), j = I, C. (11)
It follows that
τjt(z) = (1− α)pjtz¯jkαjt. (12)
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Conditions (11) imply that the relative price of the investment good satisfies
pt ≡ pIt
pCt
=
z¯C
z¯I
(
kCt
kIt
)α−1
. (13)
Using (4) and (12), we can rewrite the occupational choice condition (7) as
u [(1− α)z¯CkαCt] = u [(1− α)ptz¯IkαIt] . (14)
Since u is strictly increasing, conditions (13) and (14) imply that kCt = kIt. This,
along with condition (10), implies that kCt = kIt = Kt, so that pt = z¯C/z¯I and
τCt = τIt for all t. Finally, by (3), condition (8) leads us to conclude that
Kt+1 = (1− α)κ(rt+1)z¯IKαt .
Aggregation holds: the latter condition, along with (11) for j = I, can be used to
recover the equilibrium sequences for Kt and rt. Then, the sequence for Nt can be
computed using condition (9).
5.2 Imperfect Investor Protection
We now turn to the general case of ξ ∈ [0, 1]. First, we illustrate the lending contract.
Then, we characterize the determinants of the relative price of investment goods.
Finally, we describe the general equilibrium.
5.2.1 Characterization of the Lending Contract
Our assumptions on preferences imply that Problem (P) is independent of rt+1. Using
condition (4), it can be rewritten as
max
kjt,τjt(z)
∫
u[τjt(z)]fj(z)dz,
subject to u[τjt(z)] ≥ u[τjt(z′) + ξpjt(z − z′)kαjt] ∀ z, z′, z ≥ z′, (15)
τ¯jt ≡
∫
τjt(z)fj(z)dz = pjtz¯jk
α
jt − (rt + δ) pItkjt, (16)
kjt ≥ 0, τjt(z) ≥ 0 ∀z.
Strict concavity of the utility function implies that constraint (15) binds. Then, by
strict monotonicity of u, it follows that, for all z, z′,
τjt(z
′) = τjt(z) + ξpjt(z
′ − z)kαjt. (17)
For every ξ, entrepreneurial income will be an affine and weakly increasing function
of z. Income risk, as measured by its standard deviation, is simply std[τjt(z)] =
12
ξpjtk
α
jt × std(zj). It depends positively on the scale of production and negatively on
the level of investor protection (positively on ξ). By (17), the contracting problem
simplifies further to
max
kjt,τ¯jt
∫
u[τ¯jt + ξpjt(z − z¯j)kαjt]fj(z)dz, (18)
subject to τ¯jt = pjtz¯jk
α
jt − (rt + δ) pItkjt, (19)
kjt ≥ 0,
τ¯jt + ξpjt(z − z¯j)kαjt ≥ 0 ∀z. (20)
The following proposition provides a detailed characterization of the optimal transfer
schedule.
Proposition 1 For j = I, C, (i) There exists a time–invariant function gj : <+ →
<+ such that τjt(z) = gj(z)pjtkαjt for all t ≥ 0; (ii) The function gj satisfies the
functional equation
gj(z) =
{
z¯j(1− α− ξ)− αξ
∫
u′[gj(z)](z−z¯j)fj(z)dz∫
u′[gj(z)]fj(z)dz
+ ξz if ξ ≤ ξ∗j ,
ξz if ξ ≥ ξ∗j ,
where ξ∗j ≡ [1 + α1−αe−ση
2
j ]−1 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 5 shows how gj(z) varies with ξ. The slope of the schedule increases with
ξ. Conditional on the level of capital, the risk imposed on the entrepreneur increases
as investor protection worsens. The intercept of the schedule is weakly decreasing in
ξ, strictly for ξ < ξ∗j .
How about the level of capital? For ξ < ξ∗j , constraint (20) will not bind. The
optimal capital is determined by the necessary and sufficient condition for the solution
to program (18)–(19):
pIt (rt + δ) = αpjtk
α−1
jt (z¯j − ξωj) , (21)
where ωj ≡ −
∫
u′[gj(z)](z−z¯j)fj(z)dz∫
u′[gj(z)]fj(z)dz
≥ 0. The term ξωj is the wedge between the private
and social marginal product of capital, which is induced by imperfect risk–sharing.
To shed some light on the meaning of (21), rewrite it as
[αpjtz¯jk
α−1
jt −pIt(rt+ δ)]
∫
u′[τIt(z)]fI(z)dz = −αpjtkα−1jt
∫
u′[τjt(z)](z− z¯j)fj(z)dz.
(22)
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Figure 5: Schedules gj(z).
The term on the left–hand side is the marginal benefit of increasing capital. Raising
kjt affects the resources available for distribution to the entrepreneur in all states of
nature. The term on the right–hand side is the marginal cost of increasing capital.
Incentive compatibility implies that a larger capital can be accommodated only at
the cost of a higher variance in entrepreneurial income.
Consider first the scenario, ξ = 0, already illustrated in Section 5.1. In that case,
ωj = 0. Capital is at its first–best level and the entrepreneur is fully insured against
idiosyncratic risk. That is, gj(z) = (1− α)z¯j ∀z. For all ξ > 0, capital will be below
its unconstrained–efficient level. To see this, let ξ = 0 and think of an infinitesimal
increase in ξ. Since αpjtz¯jk
α−1
jt = pIt(rt+δ), such an increase has no first–order effect
on the left–hand–side of (22), but induces an increase in its right–hand–side. Holding
capital constant would imply an excessive level of income risk. The lender’s optimal
response is to lower kjt below its unconstrained–efficient level, therefore reducing risk
at the price of a lower average transfer.
For large enough ξ, the limited liability constraint τjt(0) ≥ 0 will bind. For
ξ > ξ∗j , the lender’s ability to fine–tune the capital advance kjt will be limited by that
constraint. In that region, kjt =
[
pIt(rt+δ)
(1−ξ)pjt z¯j
]− 1
1−α
. The private marginal benefit of
increasing capital will be higher than the marginal cost.
5.2.2 The Relative Price of Capital
As long as ηC > 0, we have that 0 < (1 − α) < ξ∗C < ξ∗I < 1. This naturally leads to
a partitioning of ξ’s domain into three regions. We consider them in turn.
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In Region I, [0, ξ∗C ], the choice of capital is unconstrained in both sectors. Let
Qt ≡ kCt/kIt. Conditions (21) imply that
pt =
z¯C − ξωC
z¯I − ξωI Q
α−1
t . (23)
Rewriting (7) as ∫
u[ptgI(z)k
α
It]fI(z)dz =
∫
u[gC(z)k
α
Ct]fC(z)dz
yields the relation
pt =
[
E[u(gC )]
E[u(gI)]
] 1
1−σ
Qαt . (24)
By (23) and (24), pt is time–invariant and is given by
p =
[
z¯C − ξωC
z¯I − ξωI
]α [E[u(gC )]
E[u(gI)]
] 1−α
1−σ
.
The ratio Qt is also time–invariant and is given by Q =
z¯C−ξωC
z¯I−ξωI
[
E[u(gI)]
E[u(gC)]
] 1
1−σ
.
In Region II, [ξ∗C , ξ
∗
I ], the choice of capital is unconstrained only in the investment
good sector. In the consumption good sector, capital is pinned down by (20), the non–
negativity constraint on transfers. Condition (21) is replaced by kCt =
[
pt(rt+δ)
(1−ξ)z¯C
]− 1
1−α
.
Along with (21) for j = I and (24), the latter implies that
p =
[
(1− ξ)z¯C
α(z¯I − ξωI)
]α [E[u(gC)]
E[u(gI)]
] 1−α
1−σ
.
Finally, in Region III, [ξ∗I , 1], the choice of capital is constrained in both sectors.
We have that
p =
(
z¯C
z¯I
)α [E[u(gC )]
E[u(gI)]
] 1−α
1−σ
= e(µC−µI)+
1
2
[(1−α)(1−σ)+α](η2c−η
2
I
).
In Regions I and II, the relative price varies with the parameter ξ. While analytical
results are not easily forthcoming, all numerical experiments we have performed show
that in those regions the relative price of capital is higher, the poorer the quality of
institutions (the higher is ξ). This is not the case in Region III, where p is invariant
with respect to ξ. In general, ξ∗I will imply an upper bound for our model’s ability
to generate dispersion in relative prices. However, as illustrated in Section 9, for all
sensible parameterizations, ξ∗I ≈ 1. Region III is always very small. For this reason,
in the remainder of the paper we will focus exclusively on Regions I and II.
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5.2.3 The Comparative Statics of the Relative Price: An Example
The purpose of this section is to provide some intuition for the fact that the relative
price increases with ξ. To that end, we consider the case of ηC = 0. In this scenario,
the possible values for ξ are the two regions [0, ξ∗I ] and [ξ
∗
I , 1]. Here we focus on [0, ξ
∗
I ].
Entrepreneurs in the consumption good sector will always be operating at the efficient
scale, and their income will simply be τCt = (1− α)z¯CkαCt. This means that the pair
(p,Q) is uniquely determined by the conditions
p =
z¯C
z¯I − ξωIQ
α−1, (25)
p =
(1− α)z¯C
[E[u(gI )]]
1/(1−σ)
Qα. (26)
Figure 6 shows the typical comparative statics of p and Q with respect to ξ. The
exercise characterizes the effects of reducing investor protection (increasing ξ from ξ0
to ξ1). The schedules labeled FOC and IND depict the relations between p and Q
implied by equations (25) and (26), respectively. Solid lines refer to the case of high
investor protection (ξ0). Dotted lines instead refer to the case of low protection (ξ1).
The FOC schedule is simply the locus of the (p,Q) pairs consistent with the
equality of the private marginal products, expressed in consumption goods. These
are αpkα−1It [z¯I − ξωI ] and αz¯Ckα−1Ct , respectively. To maintain this equality as p
increases, kC must decrease with respect to kI . The IND schedule is upward sloping
because as Q = kCt/kIt increases, an increase in the relative price is needed to keep
agents indifferent between the two occupations.
Since ξωI increases with ξ, the private marginal product of capital in the invest-
ment good sector is lower, the poorer the protection. This is why FOC1 lies above
FOC0. Also, while there exist parameter values such that the opposite occurs, in
most cases IND1 lies above IND0, as depicted in Figure 6. We are not able to prove
this result with generality because a larger ξ is accommodated by an increase in both
the mean and the variance of the random variable gI(z). Therefore, we cannot sign
the impact of such change on the denominator of the right–hand side in (26).
While p always increases with ξ, numerical simulations show that the comparative
statics of Q illustrated in Figure 6 are not a robust feature of our environment. There
exist parameter values such that Q is monotone increasing in ξ.
5.2.4 General Equilibrium
We now turn to the full characterization of the equilibrium in Regions I and II.
Condition (10) implies that kIt =
Kt
Nt+(1−Nt)Q
. Substituting into equations (8), (9),
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Figure 6: Comparative statics with respect to ξ.
and (21) yields
pKt+1 = κ(rt+1)
[
Kt
Nt + (1−Nt)Q
]α
[pNtE(gI(z)) + (1−Nt)QαE(gC (z))] , (27)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Ntz¯I
(
Kt
Nt + (1−Nt)Q
)α
, (28)
rt + δ = α
(
Kt
Nt + (1−Nt)Q
)α−1
(z¯I − ξωI). (29)
Having computed p and Q, and given K0, the three conditions above are sufficient
to characterize the equilibrium paths for Kt, Nt, and rt.
14 The sequence of consump-
tion allocations and the other quantities of interest can be easily recovered using the
relations outlined earlier in this section.
6 International Capital Flows
In principle, there is no reason to expect that the covariance pattern between relative
price, investment rate, output and investor protection that obtains under autarky
generalizes to a scenario in which international trade is allowed for. For this reason,
we now propose an alternative version of our model that allows for trade.
14Solving equation (29) for rt+1 and substituting it into (27) yields a bi–dimensional dynamic
system in Kt and Nt. This implies that, in general, the initial condition K0 is not enough to
determine a solution. In our case, however, it is. This is because, as it turns out, a competitive
equilibrium must be a saddle point path. When initialized with pairs (K0, N0) not on the saddle–
point path, the system generates sequences that violate one or more equilibrium conditions in finite
time. We are not able to prove that the saddle–path solution is unique, but numerical results hint
that this is the case. Thus, for given K0, N0 is pinned down by the requirement that the pair be on
the saddle path.
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We assume that only capital goods are tradable. All trade is intertemporal. This
implies that, consistent with the evidence,15 the absolute price of capital will be the
same across countries and all the variation in relative prices will be due to variation
in the price of consumption. Domestic financial intermediaries lend and borrow from
foreigners, taking the world interest rate r∗ as given. When referring to the aggregate
capital stock, we will now distinguish between capital owned by domestic agents (the
national capital KSt ), and capital employed by domestic entrepreneurs (the domestic
capital KDt ). In general, we will have K
S
t 6= KDt .
Trade is not free. We assume that a country engaged in transactions with the rest
of the world incurs transaction costs equal to ϕ
(
Bt
Yt
)2
Yt, where ϕ ≥ 0, Bt ≡ pt(KSt −
KDt ) is the net foreign asset position of the country, and Yt ≡ ptNtz¯IkαIt+(1−Nt)z¯CkαCt
is its gross domestic product.
Our specification of the cost schedule is very similar to that adopted by Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). The simplest way of introducing this friction in our setup
is to think of the transactions with the rest of the world as being carried out by the
government. When KSt > K
D
t , the country is a net supplier of funds. Domestic banks
transfer part of the capital borrowed from residents to the government, who lends it
to foreign residents at the rate r∗. Conversely, when KSt < K
D
t , the government
borrows from the rest of the world at the rate r∗ and lends to domestic banks. The
domestic interest rate rt is pinned down by imposing that the government runs a
balanced budget:
(r∗ − rt)pt(KSt −KDt ) = ϕ
(
Bt
Yt
)2
Yt. (30)
The parameter ϕ governs the interest rate elasticity of foreign net capital supply.
When ϕ = 0, the model becomes that of a small open economy, with infinitely elastic
capital supply. With ϕ arbitrarily large, we obtain the closed economy described
above. Since there is no country either fully closed or completely open to foreign
capital flows, the empirically relevant case is neither of those, i.e., ϕ must be positive
and finite. Section 7 develops a procedure to pin down its value. The role played by
the elasticity will be explored in Sections 8 and 9.
The definition of equilibrium is the obvious modification of Definition 1 and is
omitted for the sake of brevity. Conditions (8) and (10) now become
ptK
S
t+1 =κ(rt+1)[Ntτ¯It + (1−Nt)τ¯Ct], (31)
KDt =NtkIt + (1−Nt)kCt. (32)
15See Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
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The relative price p and relative size Q can be recovered as in Section 4. Finally,
given our assumption that consumption goods cannot be either stored or traded,
consumption must equal domestic production of the consumption good:
1− κ(rt+1)
κ(rt+1)
pKSt+1 + (1 + rt)pK
S
t = (1−Nt)z¯CkαCt.
Given an initial value for the national capital KS0 , the latter condition, along with
(21), (30), (31), and (32), yields the equilibrium paths for KDt ,K
S
t , rt, and Nt.
7 Calibration
To make our model more amenable to quantitative analysis, we allow for exogenous
TFP growth. This amounts to assuming that, for all t ≥ 0, log(zjt) = γt+ ζjt, with
ζjt ∼ N(µj , η2j ), j = I, C. The resulting economy converges to a balanced–growth
steady–state path where the interest rate rt, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
investment good sector, Nt, the relative price, pt, and Qt, are all constant, while the
remaining endogenous variables grow at the constant (continuously compounded) rate
γ/(1−α). The equilibrium values of p and Q are those of the stationary version. In the
remainder of the paper, we confine our attention to the balanced growth path. With
a little abuse of notation, from now on all variables will denote detrended values.16
The parameter values are listed in Table 1. Individuals are assumed to have a
productive life of 60 years. This implies a 30–year model period. The relative risk
aversion coefficient σ is set to 1.5, a standard value in quantitative analysis. The
parameter α is 1/3, the value considered by other studies of entrepreneurial behavior
such as Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2007) and Buera (2003). We set δ so that the
annual depreciation rate is 6%. The world average annual growth rate of real GDP
per worker in the Penn World Tables is about 2.3%, equivalent to a 30–year growth
rate of output of 97.8%. This implies γ = (1− α)× log(1.978).
Next, we need to assign values to the variance parameters ηI and ηC . In Section
2 we provided estimates of firm volatility at the 3–digit level. However, the level of
aggregation of our model is such that we need summary measures for the entire con-
sumption and investment good sectors. This is a potential problem, as such measures
will necessarily depend on the US sectoral composition, while sectoral composition
changes with the level of development. In fact, our own model provides a theory of
such change. In our benchmark calibration, we will disregard this issue. We have re–
run regression (2) imposing only one dummy variable, specifying it to equal 1 if the
16A careful characterization of the model with growth can be found in Appendix B.2.
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firm belongs to a consumption good sector, and 0 otherwise. This simple procedure
yields volatility estimates for the entire consumption and investment sectors. We set
ηI and ηC so that the implied annual standard deviations of growth rates for either
sector are equal to such estimates (0.0646 and 0.1042, respectively).17 In Section 9
we will consider an alternative procedure.
We are left with the difficult task of assigning a value of ξ to each country. Un-
fortunately, the available indicators of investor protection, such as those proposed by
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), are not suitable for this task.
A first issue is their ordinal nature. A second is that ex–ante we do not have elements
to select one or a particular combination of them as the most informative about ξ.18
In the absence of better alternatives, we recover the cross–country distribution of ξ by
imposing that, whenever possible, the model–generated prices equal their empirical
counterparts.
Consider the vector of relative prices of capital evinced from the 1996 Penn World
Table, sorted in increasing order. Let (PI/PC)h denote the price for country h. Coun-
try 1, the one with the lowest relative price of capital, is Singapore. Our model predicts
that it is also the country with the highest level of investor protection. Accordingly,
we set ξ1 ≡ 0. Then, we determine every other country h’s level of investor protection
ξh in such a way that the implied relative price, scaled by Singapore’s price, equals
its empirical counterpart:
p(ξh)
p(0)
=
(PI/PC)h
(PI/PC)1
. (33)
Since we require that ξh ∈ [0, 1] for all h, in general there will be countries whose
relative prices are so high that a feasible solution to equation (33) does not exist. Let
M be the number of countries such that a solution to equation (33) exists. Then, we
set the world price equal to the mean of the price distribution:
pw ≡ 1
M
M∑
h
p(ξh).
The collection of investor protection parameters {ξh}, along with pw, induces a vector
of PPP–adjusted investment rates
{(
Ih
Yh
)
ppp
}
.
17Strictly speaking, our model does not produce implications for firms’ sales growth rate. This is
because firms operate for one model’s period only. We define the time–t annual detrended average
growth rate in sector j as
∫ ∫
1
30
log
(
z′kαj,t+1
zkα
jt
)
fj(z)fj(z
′)dzdz′. In balanced–growth steady state,
such statistic is always zero by construction. Therefore the model’s annual standard deviation of the
sales growth rate is the square root of
∫ ∫
1
30
[
log
(
z′
z
)]2
fj(z)fj(z
′)dzdz′, or
√
2
30
ηj . Our definition of
growth rate can be rationalized by assuming that the technologies are infinitely lived and are passed
on from generation to generation.
18Although not useful for calibration purposes, the available investor protection indicators can still
be used to validate our model. We shall do so in Section 10.
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It turns out that, no matter the version of our model, the collections of investor
protection parameters and investment rates generated by the procedure just described
do not change when we change either µI or µC . This argument, formalized by Propo-
sition 2 below, implies that the choice of the two parameters is irrelevant.
Proposition 2 Along the balanced–growth path, (i) the PPP–adjusted investment
rate (I/Y )ppp is invariant to changes in the parameters µI and µC and (ii) for every
pair (ξh, ξl) the ratio p(ξh)/p(ξl) is also invariant.
Proof. For the sake of brevity, we provide a proof only for the case of closed
economy, when ξ lies in Region I. The extension to the other cases is straightforward.
The second claim follows immediately from Lemma 3 in Appendix B. To prove the
first claim, notice that the PPP–adjusted investment rate is(
I
Y
)
ppp
=
pwI
C + pwI
=
1
1 + 1−NN
z¯C
z¯I
pwQα
.
By definition of pw, Corollary 2 implies that (z¯C/z¯I)pw is invariant to changes in µI
and µC . Then, the result follows from Lemmas 2 and 4, which show the invariance of
Q and N , respectively.
Notice that, in the parametric choices made so far, nothing hinged upon a particu-
lar assumption on the magnitude of ϕ. We decide to choose the remaining parameters,
β, r∗, and ϕ, in such a way that the model generates a mean PPP–adjusted investment
rate of 0.147, the statistic generated by the Penn World Table, an average interest
rate for the top 5% countries of 4%, and a 4.2% interquartile range for interest rates.
The last two choices deserve some explanation. Since in our model there is no
aggregate risk, the return on capital is also the risk–free rate. The model provides
essentially no guidance in the choice of the security whose return should be used
as a benchmark. It seems sensible to consider the simple mean of the historical
average returns on short–term government securities and on the market portfolio,
respectively. For the United States and other industrialized countries, that number is
roughly 4%, a standard figure in business cycle analysis. Unfortunately, lack of data
on equity returns (or lack of equity markets) for developing countries prevents us
from obtaining a cross–country distribution of returns consistent with this definition.
Needing a target for returns’ dispersion, the best available alternative is to use data
on sovereign bonds’ real returns. This is the case because (i) this data allows for
the widest coverage, (ii) the computed measure of dispersion has been essentially
constant for the last 25 years, and (iii) there is no reason to expect that dispersion
would change dramatically if we considered different securities. Our target for the
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interquartile range of interest rates is that implied for the year 1996 by the data on
short–term sovereign bonds assembled by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007).
β σ α δ γ r∗ ϕ ηC ηI
0.151 1.5 1/3 0.8437 0.455 2.446 22.785 1.3704 2.2104
Table 1: Parameter Values
8 Comparative Statics
The purpose of this section is to develop implications for the co–variation between the
quality of legal institutions and other variables of interest for development economics,
e.g., GDP and the investment rate measured both in domestic and international prices.
For the parameter values listed in Table 1, Figure 7 depicts the steady–state values
implied by all ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Besides the economy parameterized in Section 7, which
we will refer to as benchmark, we consider two scenarios that differ from the latter
only in the magnitude of ϕ. The autarkic economy (dotted line) features infinitely
high transaction costs. The free capital flows economy (dashed line) allows for no
transaction cost whatsoever, i.e. ϕ = 0. Unless otherwise noted, the figures are
expressed relative to the outcome under perfect investor protection (ξ = 0). In the
free–flows economy, an equilibrium does not exist for very large ξ. Accordingly, we
limit our analysis to the subset of [0, 1] for which existence is guaranteed.19
Consider the first two panels on the bottom row. In the autarky case, the in-
vestment rate at domestic prices is monotone increasing in ξ, and the investment
rate at world prices follows the same qualitative pattern on most of the domain. At
first, this result may be surprising. But it can be rationalized quite intuitively. We
already argued that poorer protection distorts the allocation of resources between the
capital and the consumption good sector in favor of the latter. This effect goes in
the direction of lowering the investment rate. It turns out, however, that raising ξ
also generates an effect on the investment rate of the opposite sign. Here is why. For
given aggregate capital stock, poorer investor protection (i.e. a lower demand of cap-
ital from entrepreneurs in both sectors) implies a lower interest rate. For given total
resources, this translates into higher income for all entrepreneurs. In other words, a
higher ξ prompts a redistribution away from lenders (the old generation) and towards
savers (the young generation). If the effect just described is strong enough, current
19For the two economies with trade, the first panel on the top row depicts KD. The steady–state
value of KS is also decreasing in ξ. Notice also that negative interest rates do not signal a pathology.
Indeed, in every model in which capital depreciates even when is not utilized, interest rates as low as
−δ can arise in equilibrium. See for example Aiyagari (1994).
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savings and the supply of capital will increase. Given our parameterization, this is
exactly what happens in the autarky case.20 In the other two scenarios, the interest
rate adjusts less (benchmark economy) or does not adjust at all (free–flows economy).
Therefore both definitions of the investment rate decline with ξ. The same happens
to the capital stock and output. The investment rate at domestic prices does not
vary substantially with investor protection because the relative price adjusts for the
change in investor protection. The PPP–adjusted rate varies a lot more because in-
vestment is valued at the world price. Finally, notice that the comparative statics of
(I/Y )ppp do not depend on the particular value assumed by pw. What matters is pw’s
invariance to the quality of institutions.
Now consider the center panel. When conducting international transactions is
costly, but not infinitely so, poorer protection is associated with a lower domestic
interest rate, an outflow of capital, i.e. KS > KD, and a trade balance surplus. Fi-
nancial intermediaries in poor–protection countries invest their clients’ savings abroad
and use the factor payments to purchase new capital from foreign producers.21 This
is yet another answer to the question raised by Lucas (1990), who wondered why, in
contrast to the transitional dynamics of the neoclassical growth model, capital does
not flow from rich to poor countries. In the balanced–growth steady–state of our
model, capital flows indeed from the poor to the rich in search of the highest return.
Figure 7 also shows that with our benchmark calibration, measured TFP declines
with ξ. Consistent with the empirical literature,22 the Solow residual is computed as
Z = YpppK
−α, where Yppp = pwNz¯Ik
α
I + (1−N)z¯CkαC . This yields:
Z = z¯C
[
pwz¯I
z¯C
N
(
kI
K
)α
+ (1−N)
(
kC
K
)α]
= z¯C
[
pwz¯I
z¯C
N
(
1
N + (1−N)Q
)α
+ (1−N)
(
Q
N + (1−N)Q
)α]
.
These expressions help explain why measured TFP varies across countries even in the
absence of any heterogeneity in technology. As long as countries differ in investor
protection, they will be characterized by different allocations of factors (capital and
entrepreneurs) across sectors. That is, in general Q and N will vary with ξ. Over
20See Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) for a careful description of this mechanism in the
context of a simpler model.
21Without growth, the current account is in equilibrium. The trade balance equals net factor
income from abroad. When γ > 0, the current account balance (in absolute value) grows at the same
rate as output.
22See for example Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).
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Figure 7: Steady–State Values for ξ ∈ [0, 1].
most of ξ’s range, Q declines slowly. The scale of production is about the same across
sectors, and so is the productivity of capital. Measured TFP drops mainly because
the fraction of entrepreneurs active in the investment good sector decreases with ξ.
Obviously this argument is correct if and only if pw > zC/z¯I . This condition is
always satisfied, since z¯C/z¯I , the domestic price for a country with perfect investor
protection, also constitutes a lower bound for the world price. Because of imperfect
investor protection, the international price of investment goods is higher than the
social marginal rate of transformation. Therefore any factor reallocation away from
24
the investment sector reduces measured TFP.23
The main message of this simple comparative statics exercise is that cross–country
differences in legal institutions are able to generate differences in relative prices, in-
vestment rates, TFP, and GDP, that are quantitatively significant and in accordance
with the empirical evidence.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), Restuccia and Urrutia (2001), and Hsieh
and Klenow (2007) have shown that cross–county differences in the relative price of
capital and investment rate can be easily accounted for in a neoclassical framework.
What is needed is that the ratio between the net returns to investment in the capital
and consumption–good sectors, respectively, varies across countries in the appropriate
way. This ratio, or wedge, may reflect cross–sectoral variation in productivity or
policy–induced distortions that affect different industries in different ways. So far,
however, no one has taken a precise stand on its determinants. We do so in this
paper.
Providing a micro–foundation for the wedge goes beyond satisfying a purely intel-
lectual interest. At the very least, it is a necessary condition for formulating policy
recommendations. Micro–foundations also provide opportunities for model’s falsifi-
cation. Our exercise highlights why this is the case. Not only must it be that the
parameter ξ belongs to the interval [0, 1]. Tying the investment wedge to the level
of investor protection and to the variation in idiosyncratic risk, our theory generates
two further restrictions: (i) the distribution of ξ must be consistent with the cross–
country evidence on the quality of institutions and (ii) the levels of idiosyncratic risk
in the consumption and investment good sectors must agree with the data presented
in Section 2.24 The question is whether our mechanism can generate sizeable variation
in investment rates and relative prices while satisfying these restrictions. We turn to
that next.
9 Quantitative Assessment
Refer to Figure 8. The three curves are the loci of the pairs
{
p(ξ)
p(0) ,
(
I(ξ)
Y (ξ)
)
ppp
/
(
I(0)
Y (0)
)
ppp
}
,
expressed in logarithms, that obtain for ξ ∈ [0, 1] in the cases of autarky (dotted line),
23Notice that measured TFP is monotone increasing in the world price. This implies that while the
ranking of countries with respect to measured TFP is invariant to changes in pw, the cross–country
variation in this variable is not.
24Notice that these restrictions bind. If, contrary to the evidence presented in Section 9, idiosyn-
cratic risk was higher in the consumption good sector, our model would predict that poor countries
face lower relative prices of capital!
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benchmark (solid line), and free capital flows (dashed line) economies, respectively.25
The scatter plot identifies the relative price and investment rates for all countries in
the 1996 Penn World Table, relative to Singapore’s values.26
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Figure 8: Dispersion in Relative Prices and Investment Rates.
Whenever possible, we follow the simple procedure outlined in Section 7 to assign
values of ξ to countries in our dataset. (To the few whose PWT relative prices are
higher than p(1)/p(0), our procedure cannot assign a level of investor protection).
The investment rates predicted by the model can be read off the loci.
The model–implied cross–country distributions of prices and investment rates yield
measures of dispersion that can be compared with the same statistics from the Penn
World Table. Refer to Table 2. In the benchmark economy, the variance of (log) prices
is 71.5% of the variance in the PWT. The Gini coefficient of the price distribution
is 81.4% of its empirical counterpart. For the PPP–adjusted investment rates, these
statics are 38.4% and 74.3%, respectively. Consistent with what argued in Section
8, in autarky our model actually produces a positive correlation between price and
investment rate, at least for the richer countries. With free capital flows, since capital
25Recall that for the free–flows economy, an equilibrium does not exist for very large ξ. In that
case, the locus refers to the subset of [0, 1] for which this issue does not arise.
26We use the 1996 cross–section because of its extensive coverage of benchmark countries. However,
in order to maximize the number of countries, we also included some that were not benchmarked.
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Var(log p) Gini(p) Var(log I/Y ) Gini(I/Y )
Autarky 0.715 0.814 0.024 0.157
Benchmark 0.715 0.814 0.384 0.743
Free Capital Flows 0.593 0.735 3.983 1.875
Table 2: Dispersion of prices and investment rates – Relative to data
supply is infinitely elastic at the international interest rate, the model generates excess
variation in investment rates.
The bottom line is that cross–country differences in legal institutions may account
for a significant share of the observed dispersion in relative prices and investment rates.
9.1 An Alternative Calibration
Our choice of calibrating the variance parameters ηI and ηC using summary estimates
of volatility for the US is not problem–free. The reason, again, is that such estimates
depend on sectoral composition, which in turn is endogenous to the quality of in-
stitutions. An alternative approach, which we follow here, is to select one 3–digit
industry as representative of the larger sector to which it belongs. We impose two
requirements: that the industry is present in every country, and that it accounts for
a sizeable fraction of valued added and employment. Our choice falls on Building,
Developing, and General Contracting (NAICS code 233) and Food Manufacturing
(311).
The model was entirely re–calibrated to accommodate the new variance parameters.
The new loci are displayed in Figure 9. Since the difference between ηI and ηC is now
larger, the model is able to account for a larger set of relative prices. Furthermore, the
shape of autarky’s locus reveals that the effect of larger ξ on capital supply described
in Section 8, is now relatively weaker. For all ϕ, the reaction of investment rates to
changes in ξ is stronger. In turn, this implies that the model is able to generate greater
dispersion in PPP–adjusted investment rates. Refer to Table 3. In the benchmark
economy, the Gini coefficient of the price distribution is about 97% of the statistic
produced by the PWT. The model only misses Congo’s relative price. The Gini
coefficient of the investment rates’ distribution is essentially the same as in the data.
27
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Figure 9: Relative Prices and Investment Rates – Alternative Calibration.
Var(log p) Gini(p) Var(log I/Y ) Gini(I/Y )
Autarky 0.956 0.971 0.005 0.066
Benchmark 0.956 0.971 0.810 1.011
Free Capital Flows 0.840 0.895 3.042 1.523
Table 3: Dispersion in prices and investment rates – Alternative Calibration
10 Further Tests
In recent years, several scholars have attempted to assess the variation in the quality
of institutions across countries directly. These attempts involve assigning scores to
countries based on laws’ provisions, their enforcement, and the allocation of powers
across institutions. Among the indicators produced by this literature, those provided
by La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (LLSV from now on)
appear to be the most relevant for our analysis. They are geared towards measuring
the extent to which the letter of the law protects creditors’ rights (the CR indicator)
and minority shareholders’ rights (indicators OV and AR), and the extent to which
the law is actually enforced (the RL indicator).27
In spite of our assessment that the LLSV’s indicators are unsuitable for calibra-
27The variable CR is higher, the wider the range of creditor rights in firm reorganization and
liquidation upon default. The indicator anti–director rights, AR, and the dummy one share–one
vote, OV , are two indices geared towards assessing the ability of small shareholders to participate in
decision–making. Finally, the index rule of law, RL, proxies for the quality of law enforcement.
28
tion purposes, it is interesting to compare their cross–country distributions with the
model–implied distribution of ξ. This amounts to regressing relative investment prices
on the various indicators. The results, illustrated in Table 4, provide some support
Table 4: Relative Prices and Investor Protection
Dependent Variable: Relative Price (log)
Rule of law (RL) -0.09430∗∗∗
(0.01129)
One share–one vote (OV) -0.20344∗∗
(0.07628)
Antidirector rights (AR) 0.01289
(0.02372)
Creditor rights (CR) 0.04844
(0.02979)
Constant 0.66282∗∗∗
(0.12289)
Number of countries 46
Adjusted R2 0.538
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Sources: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%.
for our mechanism. The indicators RL and OV co–vary negatively with our proxy
for ξ, whereas CR and AR are not significantly correlated with them.
Our model also generates implications for the impact of investor protection on
the relationship between industry size and firm–level volatility. The relative size of
sectors is given by (1 − N)kC/NkI . In our benchmark calibration this ratio is non–
monotone. It increases with ξ on most of its domain, and decreases with it when
investor protection is very poor (ξ is relatively high). However, when we compute
the correlation between the two variables in the cross–country distribution implied
by our calibration procedure, we find evidence of a positive association between the
two measures. The empirical implication is that on average the positive impact of
investor protection on sector size should be greater, the larger firm–level volatility.
We test this implication by estimating the following regression:
log(size)jh = αh + θj + β
′ (volj × IPh) + ujh,
where sizejh is our measure of total employment in sector j in country h. It is the
average between 1985 and 2001 of the sectoral employment variable in the UNIDO
dataset.28 The variables IPc are the LLSV’s measures of investor protection already
28We collected sectoral information at the 3-digit ISIC code (Rev.3) disaggregation level from
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) files. This data is restricted to
29
used above. The variables αh and θj are country– and sector–specific dummies.
Finally, volj is our standard deviation estimate for sector j.
Our model suggests that β should be a positive–valued vector. The estimates,
reported in Table 5, are consistent with this prediction.
Table 5: Sector Size, Volatility, and Investor Protection
Dependent Variable: Log average sector size
Volatility × RL 2.20137∗∗∗
(0.4713515)
Volatility × AR 0.6593174∗
(0.8103873)
Volatility × CR 0.0277885
(0.917312)
Volatility × OV 0.8447151
(3.13555)
Number of sectors (country average) / countries 14.6 / 37
R2 within/ between/ overall 0.4895 / 0.0078 / 0.1522
Notes: Country and sector fixed effects omitted. White standard errors in parenthesis.
Sources: La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and UNIDO
1985–2001.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. ∗Significant at 10%.
11 Conclusion
This paper contributes to an active line of research that investigates the sources
of the sizeable cross–country variation in development experiences. It does so by
introducing a theory that links the quality of institutions and cross–sectoral differences
in idiosyncratic volatility to macroeconomic outcomes. The quantitative analysis
shows that our mechanism can account for a large fraction of the observed variation
in relative prices and investment rates.
In order to best illustrate our mechanism, we have abstracted from potentially
important features such as alternative sources of heterogeneity and other margins
along which economies may adjust in response to changes in institutional quality.
Modeling these features may help to understand other facets of economic development.
First, we disregarded ex–ante differences in entrepreneurial ability. The statistical
analysis conducted in Section 2 leads us to conclude that residual uncertainty accounts
for the largest share of sales growth variance. This is true for nearly all sectors we
look at. However, the same analysis has also uncovered a non–negligible amount of
heterogeneity in firm fixed–effects, which may signal ex–ante differences in ability.
manufacturing sectors. We used the correspondence tables from the U.N. Statistics Division to obtain
the equivalent NAICS 1997 codes.
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Ex–ante heterogeneity could be introduced in our framework in different ways. In
the appendix to Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2007) we assume that agents
are equally successful in the consumption good sector, but differ in their ability to
manage technologies in the investment good sector. The allocation of skill across
sectors becomes a function of investor protection. A decrease in investor protection
can lead to the reallocation of individuals away from the sector where they enjoy
a comparative advantage. In turn, this can result in greater effects on investment
rates, income, and measured TFP. We would also like to study how our quantitative
results would change if we modified our framework to allow a fraction of agents to be
financially unconstrained.
We ignored the informal sector, which is thought to be large in most developing
countries. Better investor protection, by improving the risk–sharing offered by the
banking system, may strengthen entrepreneurs’ incentives to leave the underground
economy. Indeed, the ability to borrow from banks is often cited among the reasons
that lead firms to emerge into the formal sector and start paying taxes.
In this paper we emphasized a particular source of cross–sectoral variation. We
realize, however, that considering other types of heterogeneity may lead to similar
results. According to Rajan and Zingales (1998), firms engaged in the production of
investment goods need to rely on external finance to a larger extent than their counter-
parts producing consumption goods.29 This may be the case, we conjecture, because
they tend to incur larger initial sunk costs. We think that it is possible to model
this alternative form of heterogeneity in such a way that entrepreneurs in investment
good sectors are able to finance themselves at a relative lower cost in countries char-
acterized by better investor protection. Besides representing an interesting exercise
on its own, building such model would give us the chance to contrast the explanatory
power of this form of heterogeneity with that emphasized in this paper.30
A version of our model that allowed for multiple tradable goods would generate
trade patterns qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence. In particular, in
accordance with what reported by Eaton and Kortum (2001), rich countries would
specialize in the production of equipment goods, which are among the riskier ones.31
Our last thought is about the possibility that institutions may affect long–term
29This is not exactly the classification adopted by the authors. However, even a cursory look at
their data reveals that investment–good producing sectors tend to be classified as industries in which
firms require larger access to external finance.
30Erosa and Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008) present a model with similar features.
31Cun˜at and Melitz (2007) conduct an exercise along these lines. They assess cross–sectoral varia-
tion in idiosyncratic risk in a way similar to ours, and argue that countries whose labor markets are
more flexible tend to specialize in more volatile industries.
31
growth. Conventional wisdom suggests that entrepreneurial activities leading to tech-
nological innovations are also likely to be among the riskier ones. If this is the case,
our theory suggests that innovative activities should be concentrated in high–investor
protection countries.
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A Data
Our data draws from the COMPUSTAT North–America Industrial Annual Database
from 1950 to 2005. After dropping all observations for which either net sales, em-
ployment, or the NAICS code are missing, our dataset consists of 265,018 firm–year
observations. We then proceed to delete all firms that have less than 3 observations
and those belonging to 3–digit NAICS sectors for which the yearly average number
of firms in the sample is less than 4. We also eliminate all firm–year observations
which are affected by a merger or acquisition occurred the previous year, and those
for which COMPUSTAT indicates a potential accounting problem in net sales. Fi-
nally, we drop all firms in the Finance and Insurance (3–digit NAICS from 520 to
529), Utilities (220 to 229), and Real Estate (531) industries. We also drop the firms
classified by COMPUSTAT in the 3–digit sector 999, which turns out to be a residual
category. COMPUSTAT classifies some firms according to the 1997 NAICS system
and others according to the 2002 NAICS system. We used the equivalence tables
between the two systems published by the BEA to assign every 2002 NAICS code to
a corresponding 1997 NAICS code (for example, most firms categorized by COMPU-
STAT in sector 236 are included in 233, and all of those in sector 423 are attributed
to 421).
Our next task is to assign each of the remaining sectors to either the consump-
tion or the investment category. We rely on the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ 1997
Benchmark Input–Output Use Summary Table (after redefinitions) for the US. The
Use Table tells us the fraction of output that flows from each 3–digit sector to any
of the other 3–digit industries and to final demand, respectively. We first group final
demand uses into two categories, consumption (C) and investment (I). We do this
by aggregating personal, federal, and state consumption expenditures into a single
consumption category, and similarly for investment expenditures. Since the Use Ta-
ble does not provide a breakdown of imports, exports, and changes in inventories into
consumption and investment, we choose to ignore these final demand items. We rule
out the 3–digit sectors with a contribution to final demand uses of less than 1% of
their output. For each remaining 3–digit industry j, we compute the share of out-
put destined to consumption, YC(j)/ (YC(j) + YI(j)). We assign all industries with a
share greater than or equal to 60% to the consumption good sector, and those with
a share lower than or equal to 40% to the investment good sector. We discard the
remaining industries. An alternative procedure, described in Appendix 2 of Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), includes in the consumption output of a given sector
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all the intermediate goods whose ultimate destination is final consumption, and sim-
ilarly for investment. Once sectors that produce only intermediate goods are ruled
out, this procedure yields essentially the same assignment as ours.
At the end of this process we are left with an unbalanced panel of 7,070 firms,
distributed in 57 sectors, for a total of 73,112 firm–year observations. For each sector,
Table 6 reports value added as a fraction of GDP as evinced from the Input–Output
Table, and the fraction of output ultimately destined to consumption. Table 7 reports
the yearly average number of firms per sector and the results of the estimation of
equations (1) and (2).
We carried out a variety of robustness checks. We repeated the analysis by deleting
all firm–year observations in which an IPO took place. As expected, the volatility
estimates decrease, but they do so across the board, leaving our results on the relative
volatility intact. Finally, we also experimented with alternative specifications of the
regression equation (1). In particular, we introduced a firm–specific time trend, in
order to control for trends in the growth process that are not captured by either age
or size. It turns out that adding these factors adds very little to the predictive power
of the equation, therefore leaving our results unchanged.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics
NAICS Description Value Added (%) Cons. Share (%)
Investment Sectors
213 Support Activities for Mining 0.1332 12.55
233 Building, Developing, and General Contracting 3.8833 10.49
234 Heavy Construction 3.88 3.42
235 Special Trade Contractors 3.88 3.42
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 0.30 19.89
333 Machinery Manufacturing 1.16 5.28
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 1.88 24.24
Consumption Sectors
111 Crop Production 0.79 100.00
311 Food Manufacturing 1.21 100.00
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0.58 100.00
313 Textile Mills 0.18 99.99
314 Textile Product Mills 0.12 86.99
315 Apparel Manufacturing 0.28 100.00
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.04 100.00
322 Paper Manufacturing 0.57 100.00
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 0.50 100.00
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.23 100.00
325 Chemical Manufacturing 1.54 98.36
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.71 98.40
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.47 100.00
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.53 72.24
421 Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods 6.0434 74.70
422 Wholesale Trade, Nondurable Goods 6.04 74.70
441 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 5.3135 94.76
442 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 5.31 94.76
443 Electronics and Appliance Stores 5.31 94.76
444 Building Material and Garden Equipment 5.31 94.76
445 Food and Beverage Stores 5.31 94.76
446 Health and Personal Care Stores 5.31 94.76
448 Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 5.31 94.76
451 Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, and Music Stores 5.31 94.76
32Data on value added is drawn from the 1997 Use Summary Table.
33This figure refers to the aggregate of the I–O Tables’ categories “New Residential Construction”,
“New Nonresidential Construction”, and “Maintenance and Repair Construction”.
34This figure refers to the “Wholesale Trade” category. The I–O Tables do not disaggregate it
further.
35This figure refers to the “Retail Trade” category. The I–O Tables do not disaggregate it further.
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Table 6: (continued)
NAICS Description Value Added (%) Cons. Share (%)
Consumption Sectors
452 General Merchandise Stores 5.31 94.76
453 Miscellaneous Store Retailers 5.31 94.76
454 Nonstore retailers 5.31 94.76
481 Air Transportation 0.52 94.88
482 Rail Transportation 0.25 77.12
483 Water Transportation 0.07 99.75
484 Truck Transportation 0.98 86.03
486 Pipeline Transportation 0.10 100.00
488 Support Activities for Transportation 0.2636 100.00
492 Couriers and Messengers 0.33 100.00
512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 0.31 100.00
513 Broadcasting and Telecommunications 2.28 96.56
514 Information and Data Processing Services 0.37 100.00
532 Rental and Leasing Services 0.94 100.00
561 Administrative and Support Services 2.67 100.00
562 Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.26 100.00
611 Educational Services 0.71 100.00
621 Ambulatory Health Care Services 3.12 100.00
622 Hospitals 1.76 100.00
623 Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 0.70 100.00
711 Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, ... 0.35 100.00
713 Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 0.65 100.00
721 Accommodation 0.63 100.00
722 Food Services and Drinking Places 2.01 100.00
811 Repair and Maintenance 1.63 100.00
812 Personal and Laundry Services 0.69 100.00
36This figure refers to the I–O Tables’ category “Sightseeing Transportation and Transportation
Support”.
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Table 7: Estimates
NAICS log(size) log(age) volatility (ranking) avg # firms
Investment Sectors
213 –.0031302 .0085014 .0657767 (23) 10
233 .0098189 .0137877 .1070622 (7) 14
234 .082332∗∗∗ –.1942279∗∗ .1245036 (2) 6
235 .0033294 .0130888 .0506282 (33) 6
321 –.0743625∗∗∗ –.0137304 .0865617 (13) 15
333 –.0220547∗∗∗ –.111267∗∗∗ .0888356 (12) 100
334 –.0611239∗∗∗ –.1653497∗∗∗ .1152213 (5) 255
Consumption Sectors
111 –.1939484∗∗∗ –.3041054∗∗∗ .0742716 (19) 4
311 –.0250951∗∗∗ –.0890859∗∗∗ .0489535 (34) 45
312 –.0025538 –.0378842∗ .0515543 (32) 13
313 –.003285 –.0104182 .0548013 (31) 14
314 .0087065 –.0952713∗∗ .0444283 (38) 4
315 –.0745512∗∗∗ –.106125∗∗∗ .0650508 (24) 25
316 –.0760973∗∗∗ –.063782∗∗∗ .0354913 (45) 11
322 –.0353021∗∗∗ –.0101161 .0416634 (40) 26
323 .0167837 –.0448362∗∗∗ .0428692 (39) 14
324 –.0173259 .0125759 .0488046 (35) 22
325 –.0163228 –.114327∗∗∗ .1197231 (3) 141
326 .0021413 –.0589135∗∗∗ .0638844 (26) 29
327 .0081283 –.0406237∗∗ .0584274 (30) 21
339 –.0169723 –.1712456∗∗∗ .0952873 (10) 54
421 –.0069892 –.0977216∗∗∗ .0812233 (14) 52
422 –.0453721∗∗∗ –.0646109∗∗∗ .0763564 (17) 29
441 .0691165 –.1722535∗∗∗ .0118926 (56) 4
442 –.0933022∗∗∗ –.0654218∗ .0219466 (55) 5
443 –.041673∗∗∗ –.114911∗∗∗ .0380338 (41) 6
444 –.002398 –.0944098∗∗∗ .0299617 (49) 7
445 –.0118256∗ –.0275481∗∗∗ .0308973 (48) 21
446 –.104086∗∗∗ –.0804354∗∗∗ .0361896 (44) 9
448 –.0416039∗∗∗ –.0577344∗∗∗ .0449255 (37) 22
451 –.0122337 –.0645347∗∗∗ .0338989 (46) 10
452 –.012334∗ –.0380349∗∗∗ .037139 (42) 15
453 –.0345285 –.2197272∗∗∗ .0296003 (50) 5
454 .1106638∗∗∗ –.1841804∗∗ .1192932 (4) 11
481 –.0737513∗∗∗ –.1017634∗∗∗ .0604847 (29) 21
Firm fixed effects and sectoral time dummies omitted.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
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Table 7: (continued)
NAICS log(size) log(age) volatility (ranking) avg # firms
Consumption Sectors
482 –.0611843∗∗∗ –.0550491∗∗∗ .0292361 (51) 11
483 –.0014021 –.0636376 .0617809 (27) 8
484 –.018733∗∗∗ –.0526791∗∗∗ .0257312 (53) 14
486 –.056379∗∗ –.0527639 .0481128 (36) 7
488 –.0610611∗∗ –.1219306∗∗∗ .0053382 (57) 5
492 –.0848173∗∗∗ –.002866 .0314574 (47) 4
512 –.016782 –.1070248∗ .1477931 (1) 13
513 –.0973021∗∗∗ –.1235676∗∗∗ .064266 (25) 63
514 .0401507 –.4530637∗∗∗ .1025426 (8) 17
532 –.0538958∗∗∗ –.0461446 .0804803 (15) 11
561 –.0272675∗∗ –.2128337∗∗∗ .0900958 (11) 23
562 –.0448732 –.0568337 .1077895 (6) 11
611 .0574297 –.3823941∗∗∗ .0788587 (20) 7
621 –.057038∗∗ –.2820758∗∗∗ .1052234 (9) 19
622 –.0193501 –.3326046∗∗∗ .0225713 (54) 4
623 –.0520427 .0329648 .0284807 (52) 5
711 –.0320651 .0040742 .0680707 (21) 11
713 –.0045382 –.1984318∗∗∗ .0786522 (22) 9
721 .0134744 –.1671984∗∗∗ .0775939 (16) 16
722 –.0516385∗∗∗ –.1395201∗∗∗ .0599774 (28) 33
811 –.0004886 –.3564935∗∗∗ .0365723 (43) 4
812 .0758651∗ –.1696842∗∗ .0759023 (18) 7
Firm fixed effects and sectoral time dummies omitted.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
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B Proofs and Lemmas
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Refer to the maximization program (18)–(20) Since the schedule τjt(z) is
increasing in z, condition (20) holds if and only if τjt(0) ≥ 0, i.e. if and only if
τ¯jt ≥ ξpjtz¯jkαjt. Furthermore, combining (17) and (19) leads us to conclude that
τjt(z) = pjtz¯jk
α
jt − pIt(rt + δ)kjt + ξpjt(z − z¯j)kαjt. (34)
We can thus rewrite the optimization program as
max
kjt
∫
u[pjtz¯jk
α
jt − pIt(rt + δ)kjt + ξpjt(z − z¯j)kαjt]fj(z)dz
s.t. kjt ≤
[
pIt(rt + δ)
(1− ξ)pjtz¯j
]− 1
1−α
. (35)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are (35), along with
αpjtk
α−1
jt
[
z¯j + ξ
∫
[(1 − ξ)pjtz¯jkαjt − pIt(rt + δ)kjt + ξpjtzkαjt]−σ(z − z¯j)fj(z)dz∫
[(1− ξ)pjtz¯jkαjt − pIt(rt + δ)kjt + ξpjtzkαjt]−σfj(z)dz
]
≥ pIt(rt+δ).
(36)
If (35) holds with strict inequality, then
αpjtk
α−1
jt
[
z¯j + ξ
∫
u′[τjt(z)](z − z¯j)fj(z)dz∫
u′[τjt(z)]fj(z)dz
]
= pIt(rt + δ).
Combining the latter with (34) yields
τjt(z) =
[
z¯j(1− α− ξ)− αξ
∫
u′[τjt(z)](z − z¯j)fj(z)dz∫
u′[τjt(z)]fj(z)dz
+ ξz
]
pjtk
α
jt.
The transfer function is a fixed point of the functional operator described by the right–
hand side of the last condition. In order to prove that τjt(z) = gj(z)pjtk
α
jt, it is enough
to show that that operator preserves that property. Given that u′[gj(z)pjtk
α
jt] =
(gj(z))
−σ(pjtk
α
jt)
−σ, it is straightforward to show that this is indeed the case and that
the function gj satisfies the functional equation
gj(z) = z¯j(1− α− ξ)− αξ
∫
u′[gj(z)](z − z¯j)fj(z)dz∫
u′[gj(z)]fj(z)dz
+ ξz. (37)
When (35) holds with equality, (34) yields τjt(z) = ξpjtzk
α
jt.
Finally, the value of ξ∗j is determined by imposing that both (36) and (35) hold
with equality. That is, by imposing gj(z) = ξz in (37). Recalling that
∫
zxfj(z)dz =
exµj+
1
2
η2jx
2
yields ξ∗j = [1 +
α
1−αe
−ση2j ]−1.
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B.2 Exogenous TFP Growth
For any variable xt that grows at the continuously compounded rate γ/(1−α) along
the balanced growth path, define its detrended value as xˆt ≡ e−
γ
1−α txt. Let also
zˆt ≡ eζt . Transfers are given by τjt(zt) = gjt(zt)pjkαjt, where gjt(zt) ≡ eγtgj(zˆt) for
all zt, and gj is as characterized in Proposition 1. Detrended transfers are simply
τˆjt(zt) = gj(zˆt)pj kˆ
α
It.
For given initial capital stock K̂0, the competitive equilibrium paths of K̂t, kˆIt,
kˆCt, Nt, and rt are characterized by
pK̂t+1e
γ
1−α = κ(rt+1)kˆ
α
It [pNtE(gI(zˆt)) + (1−Nt)QαE(gC(zˆt))] ,
K̂t+1e
γ
1−α = (1− δ)K̂t +Ntz¯I kˆαIt,
K̂t = NtkˆIt + (1−Nt)kˆCt,
rt + δ = αkˆ
α−1
It [z¯I − ξωI ],
where the constants z¯I and ωI are as defined in Section 5.
B.3 Lemmas
In the remainder of this Section we state and prove a few Lemmas that are used in
the proof of Proposition 2. In order to avoid cluttering the notation further, we use
the same notation employed in the description and analysis of the stationary model.
For the sake of brevity, we confine our attention to Region I. The same arguments
can be used to prove the claims on Regions II and III.
Consider the class of lognormal distributions with the same variance parameter
η, but different mean parameter. For all µ ∈ <, and with little abuse of notation,
let fµ denote the density of the lognormal distribution in such class, that has mean
parameter µ. For all integrable functions g : <+ → <+, define also the functional
operator Γµ as
Γµ[g(z)] = z¯µ(1− α)(1 − ξ)− αξ
∫
[g(z)]−σzfµ(z)dz∫
[g(z)]−σfµ(z)dz
+ ξz,
where z¯µ ≡
∫
zfµ(z)dz. Finally, denote as gµ the fixed point of the operator Γµ.
Lemma 1 For all λ ∈ < and for all z ≥ 0, eλgµ(z) = gµ+λ(eλz).
Proof. Our strategy is to conjecture that eλgµ(z) = gµ+λ(e
λz) and to show that
eλΓ[gµ(z)] = Γ[gµ+z(e
λz)]. By definition,
eλΓ[gµ(z)] = e
λz¯µ(1− α)(1 − ξ)− αξ
∫
[gµ(z)]
−σeλzfµ(z)dz∫
[gµ(z)]−σfµ(z)dz
+ ξeλz.
40
Now multiply numerator and denominator of the ratio by e−λσ. By our conjecture,
it follows that
eλΓ[gµ(z)] = e
λz¯µ(1− α)(1 − ξ)− αξ
∫
[gµ+λ(e
λz)]−σeλzfµ(z)dz∫
[gµ+λ(eλz)]−σfµ(z)dz
+ ξeλz.
By introducing the change of variable y = eλz, one obtains∫
[gµ+λ(e
λz)]−σeλzfµ(z)dz =
∫
[gµ+λ(y)]
−σy
1√
2piηy
e
−
(log−µ−λ)2
2η2 dy
=
∫
[gµ+λ(y)]
−σyfµ+λ(y)dy.
Realizing that eλz¯µ = e
µ+λ+ 1
2
η2 = z¯µ+λ concludes the proof.
Corollary 1 For all σ ≥ 0, σ 6= 1, ∫ [gµ+λ(z)]1−σfµ+λ(z)dz = eλ ∫ [gµ(z)]1−σfµ(z)dz
and
∫
[gµ+λ(z)]
1−σzfµ+λ(z)dz = e
λ
∫
[gµ(z)]
1−σzfµ(z)dz.
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Proof. By Lemma 1, gµ+λ(z) = e
λgµ(e
−λz). Then, the result follows immediately
from the change of variable y = e−λz.
Let Q(µC , µI) denote the ratio Q, when the mean parameters of the two distribu-
tions are µC and µI , respectively. That is:
Q(µC , µI) =
z¯µC − ξωµC
z¯µI − ξωµI
[
EµI [g
1−σ
µI
(z)]
EµC [g
1−σ
µC (z)]
] 1
1−σ
.
Lemma 2 The ratio Q ≡ kCkI is invariant with respect to both µC and µI . That is,
for all λ ∈ <,
Q(µC + λ, µI) = Q(µC , µI),
Q(µC , µI + λ) = Q(µC , µI).
Proof. We will prove only the first claim. By Corollary 1,
ωµC+λ = z¯µC+λ−
∫
[gµC+λ(z)]
−σzfµC+λ(z)dz∫
[gµC+λ(z)]
−σfµC+λ(z)dz
= eλ
[
z¯µC −
∫
[gµC (z)]
−σzfµC (z)dz∫
[gµC (z)]
−σfµC (z)dz
]
= eλωµC
and
EµC+λ[g
1−σ
µC+λ
(z)] =
1
1− σ
∫
[gµC+λ(z)]
1−σfµC+λ(z)dz =
eλ(1−σ)
1− σ
∫
[gµC (z)]
1−σfµC (z)dz
= eλ(1−σ)EµC [g
1−σ
µC (z)].
37An analogous result can be easily proved in the case of unit elasticity.
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This allows us to conclude that
Q(µC + λ, µI) =
z¯µC+λ − ξωµC+λ
z¯µI − ξωµI
[
EµI [g
1−σ
µI
(z)]
EµC+λ[g
1−σ
µC+λ
(z)]
] 1
1−σ
=
eλz¯µC − eλξωµC
z¯µI − ξωµI
[
EµI [g
1−σ
µI (z)]
eλ(1−σ)EµC [g
1−σ
µC (z)]
] 1
1−σ
= Q(µC , µI).
Let p(µC , µI) denote the relative price when the mean parameters of the two
distributions are µC and µI , respectively. That is:
p(µC , µI) =
[
z¯µC − ξωµC
z¯µI − ξωµI
]α [EµC [g1−σµC (z)]
EµI [g
1−σ
µI (z)]
] 1−α
1−σ
.
Lemma 3 For all λ ∈ <,
p(µC + λ, µI) = e
λp(µC , µI).
p(µC , µI + λ) = e
−λp(µC , µI).
Proof. It follows the same steps of the proof of Lemma 2.
Corollary 2 Consider the distribution of prices {ph} generated by any collection of
investor protection parameters {ξh}. Then, Lemma 3 also applies to the mean and
median of that distribution.
Let kj(µC , µI) denote the equilibrium capital advancement in sector j when the
mean parameters of the two distributions are µC and µI , respectively.
Lemma 4 The interest rate r and the fraction of investment sector entrepreneurs N
are invariant with respect to µC and µI .
Proof. We will prove the claim only in the case of µC . Our strategy is to: i)
conjecture that r is invariant; ii) prove that, conditional on this conjecture being
valid, N is also invariant; iii) verify our conjecture. By Lemma 3,
kα−1C (µC + λ, µI) =
p(µC + λ, µI)(r + δ)
α[z¯µC+λ − ξωµC+λ]
=
eλp(µC , µI)(r + δ)
αeλ[z¯µC − ξωµC ]
= kα−1C (µC , µI).
On balanced–growth steady–state, (9) and (10) write as
(eγ/(1−α) + δ − 1)K = Nz¯IkαI ,
K = NkI + (1−N)kC .
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Use the two to obtain
z¯µIk
α−1
I (µC + λ, µI)
eγ/(1−α) + δ − 1 = 1 +
[1−N(µC + λ, µI)]
N(µC + λ, µI)
Q(µC + λ, µI).
By Lemma 2,
z¯µIk
α−1
I (µC , µI)
eγ/(1−α) + δ − 1 = 1 +
[1−N(µC + λ, µI)]
N(µC + λ, µI)
Q(µC , µI).
It follows that N(µC + λ, µI) = N(µC , µI). On balanced–growth steady–state, con-
ditions (27) and (28) imply
pNz¯I
eγ/(1−α) + δ − 1 = κ(r) [pNE[gI(z)] + (1−N)Q
αE[gC(z)]] .
In turn, this means that
p(µC + λ, µI)z¯µI
eγ/(1−α) + δ − 1 =
= κ[r(µC + λ, µI)]
[
p(µC + λ, µI)EµI [gµI (z)] +
1−N(µC + λ, µI)
N(µC + λ, µI)
Qα(µC + λ, µI)EµC+λ[gµC+λ(z)]
]
.
By Corollary 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3, this is equivalent to
p(µC , µI)z¯µI
eγ/(1−α) + δ − 1 = κ[r(µC + λ, µI)]
[
p(µC , µI)EµI [gµI (z)] +
1−N(µC , µI)
N(µC , µI)
Qα(µC , µI)EµC [gµC (z)]
]
.
In turn, this verifies that r(µC + λ, µI) = r(µC , µI).
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